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Court/Tribunal: Supreme Court of Japan 
Case: 2006 (Gyo-Tsu) No. 135 
 
This case came before the Supreme Court of Japan when the appellant alleged that 
Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Nationality Act (“Act”) violated Article 14, paragraph 1 of Japan’s 
Constitution. The Act governs how a person may acquire Japanese nationality, Article 3 para. 1 
allows a child born out of wedlock to a Japanese father and a non-Japanese mother to gain 
Japanese nationality through “legitimation,” i.e. acknowledgement by the father and subsequent 
marriage of the parents. Article 3, para. 1 does not allow a child with a Japanese father and a 
non-Japanese mother whose parents never wed to claim Japanese nationality, even if the child is 
acknowledged by the father. It is this distinction that the appellant claims violates the 
Constitution. In a 10-5 majority, the Court held that the legitimation requirement did violate the 
Constitution.  
 
The appellant was born to a Japanese father and a Filipino mother. The father acknowledged the 
appellant as his child, but this took place after the birth of the child, not prior. If the 
acknowledgment had taken place prior to the child’s birth, the child could have acquired 
nationality under Article 2, item 1 of the Act, which grants nationality where the mother or father 
is a Japanese citizen at the time of birth. The appellant submitted a notification to the Ministry of 
Justice for acquisition of Japanese nationality and the Minister determined that the appellant 
failed to meet the required specifications because legitimation had not occurred. The appellant 
sued, seeking a declaration of his/her Japanese nationality.  
 
The court of the first instance dismissed the appellant’s claim, reasoning that even if the 
legitimation provision were unconstitutional, it would simply be void and would not lead to a 
new system for granting Japanese nationality, nor would the appellant automatically acquire 
Japanese nationality as a result. The appeal counsel continued to allege that disparate treatment, 
or a “Distinction” as the Court refers to it, arises as a result of Article 3, para. 1. Counsel for the 
appellant also argued that the Act was only unconstitutional with regard to the part of it that 
causes the Distinction, and the appellant should be granted nationality under the remaining part 
of the paragraph.  
 
The Court looked to Article 14 of the Constitution, which provides for equality before the law. 
Based on the supremacy of the Constitution, if no reasonable basis can be found in the legislative 
purpose for making a distinction, such as the one in the Act, or where no reasonable relevance 
can be found between the distinction and the legislative purpose, then the provision violates 
Article 14, para. 1 of the Constitution, regardless of the legislature’s discretionary power. The 
Court determined that where there may have once been a reasonable basis for such a distinction 
one no longer exists, using comparative law and changes in circumstances as the foundation for 
this judgment.  
 
The Court reasoned that the legislature’s purpose when drafting the Act was to ensure that those 
who were granted nationality had close ties with the country, theorizing that if the parents wed, 
the child would maintain a close tie to Japan through his or her family life. At the time of the 
Act’s drafting, many other countries required both acknowledgement and legitimation for an 
individual to acquire nationality. The Court relied on the fact that this is no longer widely in 
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practice. The Court also pointed out that social and economic changes in Japan render this part of 
the Act less relevant; many different family lifestyles and increasing numbers of international 
father-mother relationships mean that there will be increasing numbers of children in the 
appellant’s situation. More importantly, it means that a person in such a situation may be just as 
likely to have close ties with Japan as someone whose parents are legally wed. The Court also 
referred to the issue of gender equality that the provision raises; a child born to a Japanese 
mother will have no problem obtaining nationality, but one born to a Japanese father is presented 
with potential difficulties. The Court concluded that while naturalization is available to people in 
the appellant’s situation, it is an inadequate substitute because they are then dependent upon the 
discretion of the Minister of Justice.  
 
The Court also addressed whether they are free to alter the Act in a manner as to give relief to the 
appellant or whether this can only be done by the legislative body. The Court determined they 
can give relief by excluding the part of the paragraph that imposes the extra requirement, the 
subsequent marriage of the mother and father, while leaving the remaining parts intact. They 
held that this is not the same as imposing a new requirement, which is the exclusive purview of 
the legislature. Consequently, the appellant was found to have acquired Japanese nationality 
pursuant to the requirements set forth in Article 3, para. 1 of the Act, excepting the voided 
legitimation clause.  
 
There were five dissenting opinions by Justices Yokoo, Tsuno, Furuta, Kainaka and Horigome 
who would have held that the changes the Court advocates are legislative in nature, and cannot 
be dealt with by the judiciary.  
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